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Consider the following generic and fairly narrowly defined choice 
problem. An individual must choose from amongst a discrete and finite set 
of lotteries. Suppose for concreteness that each lottery represents a 
monetary payoff, and that all the lotteries are constructed so as to be 
comparable. As a running example, the lotteries could represent incomes 
in different countries in given years, and comparability could be ensured, 
at least in principle, by converting to a common metric using inflation- and 
purchasing power parity-adjusted exchange rates. Each lottery is 
characterized by a corresponding distribution function, that is known with 
certainty. The uncertainty arises because, if the individual picks a 
particular distribution, he will receive a payoff that is a random draw from 
that distribution. How is he to choose amongst these lotteries? Assuming 
that his preferences are such that they admit of a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility representation greatly simplifies the 
problem. Now, the individual will pick the lottery that gives him the 
maximum level of expected utility. 
 
If the individual is risk-neutral, so that his expected utility function is 
linear in the monetary payoff, the problem is not especially interesting. 
From conventional economic theory, we know that maximizing expected 
utility in this case will reduce to maximizing the expected payoff, given the 
linearity of the expectation operator. The individual will simply pick the 
lottery that has the highest corresponding expected value, assuming, as I 
shall do throughout, that this (as all other relevant moments) exists and is 
well-defined for all the lotteries. In our example, this would involve 
picking the country whose income distribution has the highest mean 
income, i.e., income per capita. 
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Things get more interesting if the individual is risk-averse. Now, there is 
no general rule for picking amongst these competing lotteries, and, in 
theory, the entire distribution function for each of the lotteries is relevant. 
With a finite, discrete set of lotteries, the problem can be solved, at least in 
a mechanistic way, by computing the realized level of expected utility, for 
a given utility function, for each of the distributions, and picking the 
distribution with the highest corresponding expected utility level. But this 
approach does not yield much, if any, insight. An alternative, indeed the 
“right” approach, would be to employ the concept of stochastic 
dominance, of various orders, as developed in the literature on the 
economics of uncertainty. This corresponds to the concept of revealed 
preference in standard utility theory. Stochastic dominance, roughly 
speaking, allows, for any pairwise comparison, to say which of two 
distributions is “better” than the other. First-order stochastic dominance 
(FSD) exists, intuitively, if one distribution lies everywhere “above” 
another one: in this case, it can be proved that anyone with VNM 
preferences will prefer the higher distribution. This is only a partial 
ordering, however, as FSD very often does not exist when comparing pairs 
of distributions. The next concept is that of second-order stochastic 
dominance (SSD): this exists, intuitively, if one distribution is less “risky” 
than another, and, in this case, it can be proved that anyone with VNM 
preferences that are risk-averse will prefer the less risky distribution. 
While this, too, is a partial ordering, it takes us quite a bit further towards 
the problem our individual is facing. (There is a dauntingly technical 
literature addressing higher orders of stochastic dominance, and 
corresponding restrictions on the utility function thereby implied in VNM 
and other frameworks, that I will not be exploring here.) Given a finite, 
discrete set of lotteries, there exists a finite, discrete set of pairwise 
comparisons amongst them: if one could find a particular distribution that 
SSD each of the others in a series of pairwise comparisons, one has found, 
pari passu, the expected utility maximizing choice. 
 
The problem, as described above, seems dry and pedantic, and appears to 
have a narrow range, if any, of applications. The opposite is true. Consider, 
again, our running example, in which the lotteries are considered income 
distributions, and let us now make the problem a bit more precise as well 
as more concrete. Suppose, now, our individual is a putative migrant, 
considering which out of a group of n countries he should choose as his 
preferred location. For simplicity, assume that migration is costless. Thus, 
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without loss of generality, assume that his current location is one of the n 
locations. The individual potentially cares about various characteristics of 
the locations. For simplicity, assume that he cares only about the income 
he may enjoy. Strictly, he should care about some measure of wealth, or 
lifetime or “permanent” income, if a forward-looking agent. Restrict the 
analysis to the flow of income, for simplicity. The individual does not 
know with certainty what level of income he will enjoy in each location. 
He knows the probability distributions over income levels in each of the n 
locations. Let us suppose, for simplicity, that he assumes that, were he to 
migrate to location i, the income he would thereafter enjoy is a random 
draw from the probability distribution over income corresponding to 
location i. This assumption is not necessarily innocuous: the putative 
migrant, if sophisticated enough, would presumably prefer to derive a 
conditional probability distribution, conditioning on relevant prior factors 
such as gender, education, work experience, etc. These considerations, too, 
are excluded for simplicity. Assume, further, that income is computed so 
as to ensure commensurability, i.e., each location’s statistical agency uses 
an identical methodology, and that each location’s statistics are expressed 
in a common metric, e.g., PPP-adjusted US dollars fixed to a base year. 
 
With the problem thus defined, which location will he choose? As it 
happens, this is an exact instance of the generic type of problem that we 
have been discussing, and it is related to ongoing debates about the 
appropriate ways of comparing incomes internationally, far from an 
arcane and academic matter. As a pertinent example, in a recent review 
article in the influential policy journal, Foreign Affairs, Joseph Stiglitz 
(2005) comments on the fact that in recent times mean income has risen in 
the United States, while median income has actually fallen. He continues: 
“Consider the following thought experiment: If you could choose which 
country to live in but would be assigned an income randomly from within 
that country’s income distribution, would you choose the country with the 
highest GDP per capita? No. More relevant to that decision is median 
income … As the income distribution becomes increasingly skewed, with 
an increasing share of the wealth and income in the hands of those at the 
top, the median falls further and further below the mean. That is why, 
even as per capita GDP has been increasing in the United States, U.S. 
median household income has actually been falling.” 
 
This rich quotation from Stiglitz contains, inter alia, an assertion about the 
evolution of the shape of the income distribution in the United States: 
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whether this is accurate or not is an empirical question, that I and Marcel 
Voia (in progress) take up elsewhere. It also contains a claim about what I 
would call a “rule of thumb” choice rule in the context of just exactly the 
type of generic problem we have been considering. In particular, Stiglitz 
seems to be suggesting that, when faced with a choice over a set of income 
distributions that are rightward skewed, a risk-averse individual would do 
better to pick the one with the highest median, not the highest mean. This 
would be, presumably, because the mean, in some sense, overestimates the 
“true” centre of the data, compared to the median. (The mean would, 
presumably, underestimate, in this sense, if the distribution were leftward 
skewed.) This would seem to accord with common sense. After all, a few 
very rich individuals raise US mean income, but do nothing to the median: 
so it is surely sensible to imagine that you are going to end up somewhere 
around the median, and discount the effect that Bill Gates and his ilk have 
upon the mean. 
 
I will note, in passing, that there is also a more abstract, indeed 
philosophical, interpretation to the situation just described. One can 
imagine, not a putative migrant, but a rational agent, behind a Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance, deciding on what sort of society he would like to live in. 
The only modification is that there would be now, not a finite, but a 
(hopefully countably) infinite number of distributions to consider, and the 
choice of a particular distribution represents, not the choice of a location 
where one would like to migrate, but the shape of a just society to which 
one wishes to belong. John Rawls’ celebrated investigation along these 
lines yielded the “maximin” rule: society should maximize the well-being 
of its least-well off member. One could imagine constructing a neo-
Rawslian, call it Stiglitzian, political theory in which the chosen rule is to 
maximize the well-being of the median individual in society. I will not 
pursue these philosophical reflections further in this paper. 
 
How does this common sense intuition, and the rule of thumb that it 
generates, i.e., “pick the highest median, not the highest mean”, square 
with the theoretical concepts of stochastic dominance that we have just 
discussed? Strictly, there need be no correspondence between FSD, SSD, or 
other higher orders of stochastic dominance, and simple summary 
statistics such as the mean or median. Nor does expected utility theory 
provide any guidance, for there is no generally known class of sub-utility 
function for which median-maximizing behavior will typically be optimal. 
(The closest such result, that does not really help us, is in statistical 
 4
decision theory, where minimizing a mean absolute deviation loss function 
yields the median as a solution.) My approach, therefore, will have to be 
heuristic. What I shall do is to consider a real world application, our 
running example of income distribution, with empirically constructed 
distribution functions, invoke the VNM framework, and check to see if 
there is a rough correspondence in practice, if not in theory, between the 
optimal solution for a risk-averse expected utility maximizer and the 
solution found by using a simple rule of thumb. 
 
My application, therefore, is to the policy-relevant problem of international 
income comparisons, that flows naturally from the Stiglitz quotation. Here, 
I draw upon work in progress by myself and Marcel Voia, already 
mentioned. To make the location choice concrete, consider just two 
countries, the United States and Canada. This is a sensible comparison, as 
the various non-economic factors that might play a role in choosing 
between the US and Canada, such as geography, language, culture, 
history, social norms, etc., are about as close as they could be between any 
pair of developed countries. We have annual income data for the US and 
Canada for the years 1993 – 2001, but, when we eliminate years with 
missing data for one or the other country, we have comparable data for the 
following six years: 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. All data are 
converted into 1993 US dollars to allow cross section and time series 
comparisons. We can apply stochastic dominance tests to the six pairwise 
comparisons that we have, but, before doing so, it might be more intuitive 
to compare the solutions yielded by various rules of thumb to what would 
be optimal for an expected utility maximizer with a specific utility 
function. Consider the simplest case of risk aversion, logarithmic utility, 
which implies an Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion of unity. 
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained. 
 
Along with the realized level of expected utility (for our individual with 
log utility), the table reports three summary statistics, mean, median, and 
mode, which could serve as potential rules of thumb. For each pairwise 
comparison, i.e., income in the US and Canada for a given year, we can see 
which has the higher level of expected utility, and then can check whether 
going by the rule of thumb, “pick the higher …” (mean, median, or mode) 
yields the “right” or “wrong” answer. The first thing to note is that in all of 
the comparable years, Canada yields higher expected utility than the US. 
For 1993, the mean and mode given the right answer, whereas the median, 
being identical, cannot choose. For 1994, the median and mode give the 
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right answer, and the mean gives the wrong answer. This pattern is 
repeated in 1996 and 1997. In 1998, the mean, median, and mode all give 
the right answer, a pattern repeated in 1999. 
 
What emerges from this application is at least qualified support for the 
Stiglitz intuition, and the “pick the higher median” rule of thumb. Only in 
1993, with identical medians, the rule would not be able to choose, and 
then it could be supplemented with a sub-rule, “if medians are identical, 
pick the higher mean”. With this modification, the median rule would 
choose perfectly, at least in this particular application. 
 
For analytical completeness, we can conduct stochastic dominance tests on 
these distributions. The results are reported in Dehejia and Voia (in 
progress), and they confirm the intuition of the log utility special case: in 
each of the six comparable cases, the Canadian distribution SSD the US 
distribution. This makes more precise the appealing result noted above, 
that, at least in this particular application, a common sense rule of thumb, 
picking the higher median, yields the same result as a formal test for 
stochastic dominance, and hence is the “right” choice for a risk-averse 
expected utility maximizer to make. 
 
One can imagine a number of other potential applications, which would be 
a useful way to test the merits of the various rules of thumb. Possibilities 
would include location choice (more generally), education choice, 
occupation choice, and comparison of stock portfolios, to name just a few. 
It remains for future work to construct tables analogous to Table 1, to test 
the various rules of thumb against the expected utility criterion and also to 
perform tests of stochastic dominance. The Stiglitz hypothesis, amongst 
others, remains an attractive possibility in the interim. 
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Table 1 
 
 The data is conditional on a maximum income of 250000 Canadian dollars. 1993 is used as a base year. 
   USA data    
 year # obs Mean Median Mode Expected Utility 
 1993 62721 21576 16690 1498.38 0.001069202 
 1994 62721 21744 15684 8689.29 0.000952034 
 1995 62721 21599 15731 6858.57 0.001238318 
 1996 65439 22332 15228 5372.53 0.000629032 
 1997 65438 22038 15223 7940.92 0.000490796 
 1998 65435 22023 15344 7978.89 0.000358032 
 1999 65435 22127 15644 7375.43 0.000391709 
 2000 x x X X x 
 2001 65445 20135 14094 11297.37 0.001292198 
       
 Note: x =missing data for the given year   
       
   Canadian Data   
 year # obs Mean Median Mode Expected Utility 
 1993 29536 21583.84 16690 3117.14 0.001322103 
 1994 29362 21577.82 16267.4 9912.28 0.001149368 
 1995 x x X X x 
 1996 61064 21749.14 16303 8760.95 0.001598236 
 1997 61455 21957.46 16485 13464.01 0.000698163 
 1998 62140 22491.71 17125.5 9987.22 0.000529192 
 1999 58051 23049.02 17643.72 11497.9 0.000397064 
 2000 57380 23376.8 17770.38 14405.81 0.000435218 
       
 Note: x =missing data for the given year   
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